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INTRODUCTION
AFTER THE FALL:
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Robert B. Ahdieh*
Recent years have challenged the international order to a degree not seen
since World War II-and perhaps the Great Depression. As the U.S. housing
crisis metastasized into a financial and economic crisis of grave proportions,
and spread to nearly every corner of the globe, the strength of our international
institutions-the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization,
the Group of Twenty, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and
others-was tested as never before. Likewise tested, were the limits of our
national commitment to those institutions, to our international obligations, and
to global engagement more generally.
The Symposium published in this issue of the Emory International Law
Review speaks to one critical dimension of these challenges. Even before the
crisis, the commitment of the industrialized states of the global "North" to the
developing and least developed economies of the global "South" might fairly
have been questioned. The limited progress of the supposedly development-
oriented Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations might be cited to argue
as much.' In the face of a broadly rising tide, however, all boats were rising-
even if less consistently than an equitable distribution of wealth might have
counseled.2
With the onset of the crisis, however, such gains could no longer be
assured. Even more worrisome, if the crisis were to trigger a substantial
contraction in foreign aid or increased trade barriers, significant backsliding
might be expected to occur. But in the midst of great crisis-as counseled by
the theme of this Symposium-one may sometimes find great opportunity. In
the face of the reassessments prompted-even demanded-by the crisis, there
emerges the possibility of a more foundational change in approach, by which
* Professor of Law & Director, Center on Federalism & Intersystemic Governance, Emory University
School of Law.
1 See generally Raj Bhala, Doha Round Betrayals, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 147 (2010).
2 See Rik Kirkland, The Greatest Ecomonic Boom Ever, FORTUNE, July 23, 2007, at 120-28.
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the strength and vitality of the international order might not merely be
preserved, but actually enhanced.
The challenge of allocating the benefits and burdens of social and
economic development both equitably and efficiently was not, of course,
created by the financial crisis. Considering only the most immediate agenda
items facing the international community-issues of climate change, public
health, and international terrorism have all contributed as well. With the crisis,
however, questions of development, distribution, and equity have come to a
head.
The Emory International Law Review has secured a fascinating set of
contributions directed to these questions, addressing a broad array of issues
and offering distinct new perspectives on them. The articles most directly
concerned with the financial crisis, to begin, offer institutional analyses-and
concrete proposals-that will add greatly to debates over the crisis and its
implications. Duncan Alford, for example, outlines the increasingly important
role of supervisory colleges, even as he highlights the continuing need for an
institutional framework to wind down insolvent banks. 3 To similar effect is Raj
Bhala's critique of the international trade regime's shift from its Doha Round
focus on poverty reduction and the discouragement of Islamic extremism to
more mundane aspirations,4 and Ross Buckley's critique of the International
Monetary Fund's capacity to play a meaningful role in international finance.
More broadly, Yesha Yadav's account of the complexity of international
financial regulation and proposed framing of relevant regulation around
systemic risk oversight, standard-setting, and the articulation of relevant
principles for international finance also adds greatly to the debate.6 Scott
Harshbarger and Goutam Jois likewise speak to the institutions of financial
regulation, proposing the creation of a systemic risk regulator, but one framed
within a new analytical framework for the reconciliation of market and
regulatory power, built on a regime of accountability and citizen
3 See generally Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving
International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 57 (2010).
4 See Bhala, supra note 1.
See generally Ross P. Buckley, Improve Living Standards in Poor Countries: Reform the International
Monetary Fund, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 119 (2010).
6 See generally Yesha Yadav, The Specter of Sisyphus: Re-making International Financial Regulation
After the Global Financial Crisis, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 83 (2010).
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empowerment.7 Together, these contributions-along with fascinating papers
by Peter Crofton and Joanna Stettner, speaking respectively to critical
questions of transnational environmental regulation and public health8-offer a
rich trove of material for better understanding the financial crisis, the
distribution of global wealth and responsibility, and the future of the
international economic, political, and legal order.
By way of introduction, I offer another take on the theme of the
Symposium, drawing on both strands of the Symposium articles and broader
evidence as well. I highlight, in particular, the striking fact that the financial
crisis has not proven nearly as damaging to the vibrancy and vitality of the
international economic, political, and legal order as might have been
predicted-and even expected, given the logical precedent of the Great
Depression. Minimally, the international order has held up well in the face of
the crisis; arguably, it has thrived.
I. PAST AS PROLOGUE?
In the face of grave crises, some instinct of self-preservation might be
expected to encourage heightened insularity, and even isolationism, among
relevant states. Some of this tendency might be explained by a desire to
exercise heightened control in circumstances of heightened uncertainty. A
more acute sense of self-interest-given increased scarcity and seemingly
greater costs of failure-might be expected to contribute to this pattern.
As states respond to these individual pressures toward insularity, however,
there emerges a vicious cycle. Whatever the initial trigger, increased isolation
by any given nation prompts a reciprocal response by others. These responses,
in turn, drive the initial movers to isolate themselves further, initiating the
cycle anew.
The United States's response to crises over the last century-both financial
and otherwise-largely confirms these expectations. In the case of each world
war, the United States long resisted engagement. 9 In the aftermath of World
7 See generally Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Turning the Page on the Global Financial Crisis:
Civic Capitalism and a Blueprint for the Future, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 15 (2010).
8 See generally Peter M. Crofton, Alternative Fuels and Developing Nations: Who Will Pay the Piper?,
24 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 185 (2010); Joanna Stettner, International Obesity: Legal Issues, 24 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 209 (2010).
9 See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat, FOREIGN AFr., July-
Aug. 1995, at 2-3.
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War I, in turn, the United States drew back into its shell-refusing to join the
League of Nations, adopting the Neutrality Acts of 1935 through 1937, and
refusing membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice. 10 Even
after World War II, selected strands of isolationism again took hold in the U.S.
psyche, and even government policy.
Most instructive as to the "Great Recession" we have endured of late,
however, is the cautionary tale of the Great Depression. Famously, the United
States responded to the stock market crash of 1929 with the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930 ("Tariff Act of 1930",).12 Motivated by a desire to protect
American workers and farmers from foreign competition, the Tariff Act of
1930 was emblematic of the pattern suggested above.13 At base, it sought to
insulate the U.S. economy from the rest of the world. Its result, however, was a
vicious cycle of tariff rate increases (and currency devaluations) that ultimately
drove the global economy into the Great Depression.14
II. THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Comparing events of the last several years to the account described above,
however, a story of insulation and isolation proves difficult to tell. In fact, just
the opposite might be suggested. Arguably, the international economic,
political, and legal order has not merely survived the financial crisis-it has
thrived amidst it. One might variously identify fiscal, institutional, and
aspirational indicia of this anomalous observation.
A. Fiscal Indicia ofInternationalism Amidst the Crisis
To begin, a story of insulation and isolation is difficult to reconcile with
three aspects of the fiscal, economic, and trade policies of the United States
10 See David J. Bederman, Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 29, 49 (2006); Elizabeth Borgwardt, "When You State a Moral Principle, You
Are Stuck With It": The 1941 Atlantic Charter as Human Rights Instrument, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 530 n.83
(2006).
1 Consider, for example, the anti-interventionism that emerged in the post-war years. See Schlesinger,
supra note 9, at 4-5.
12 See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE
L.J. 140, 175-76 (2009). One might also note the succession of competitive devaluations that occurred at the
time. See Bhala, supra note 1, at 158-59.
13 See Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tarif in 12 RESEARCH IN
EcoNOMIc HISTORY 3-9 (Roger L. Ransom, Peter H. Lindert & Richard Sutch eds., 1989).
14 See id. at 31-35 (noting a cycle of tariff rate increases following the Tariff Act of 1930, among other
contributing factors to the Great Depression).
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and other developed countries amidst the crisis. The first is the case of the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). Just a few short years ago, many were
drafting the epitaph of the IMF.1 As recently as December 2007, the IMF
undertook budget cuts in the hundreds of millions of dollars and initiated plans
to eliminate almost 15% of its workforce.16 Minimally, the IMF was an
institution in decline; to many, it was living on borrowed time.
At the height of the financial crisis, however, the Group of 20 ("G-20")
undertook to provide a massive infusion of new capital into the IMF,
increasing its lending assets by roughly $1 trillion.17 This included funds not
only for new credit lines, but also for a dramatic increase in the IMF's special
drawing rights-funds seen by some as a potential alternative to the U.S. dollar
as a global reserve currency.
Besides the resurgence of the IMF, our successful avoidance of potential
isolation and insulation might also be seen in aspects of the U.S. government's
bailout of distressed corporations-and particularly of the American Insurance
Group, Inc. ("AIG"). At the time of the AIG bailout, as many readers will
recall, there was much talk of the need to disclose the counterparties to AIG's
credit default swap contracts-the ultimate beneficiaries of any bailout of the
firm.19 The concern, it became clear, was that a significant number of those
counterparties were foreign banks and other overseas entities.20 With the
provision of bailout funds to AIG, thus, significant U.S. tax dollars would end
up overseas. Amidst all the talk, however, there was little suggestion that the
bailout might be limited to domestic counterparties. 2 1 Nor was any provision
made for such a limitation.
15 See Buckley, supra note 5, at 131-32, 135.
16 See Bob Davis, IMF Plans to Cut Jobs, Lift Income, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2007, at A3.
17 See Henry Chu, Jim Puzzanghera & Paul Richter, G-20 Summit Surprises with Show of Unity, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2009, at Al; see also Buckley, supra note 5, at 141-42.
1R See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Says Dollar Makes Poor Reserve Currency, N.Y. TIms, June 6, 2009,
at B3; see also Buckley, supra note 5, at 142. The shift to a reduced degree of conditionality in the IMF's
assistance programs likewise deserves note. See IMF to Ease Lending Practices to Aid Distressed Countries,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at B7.
19 See Sue Kirchhoff, Lawmakers Press Fed for AIG Answers, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2009, at 6B.
20 See Detlev F. Vagts, The Financial Meltdown and Its International Implications, 103 AM. J. INT'L L.
684, 684 (2009); Yadav, supra note 6, at 101-02.
21 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Firms to Which It Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2009, at Al.
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Especially given the "brooding omnipresence" 22 of the Great Depression as
operative precedent for our own Great Recession, a final fiscal and economic
indicator of the international order's successful resistance to insulation and
isolation is the lack of any significant protectionist response to the financial
crisis. As Raj Bhala documents in his contribution to the Symposium, there has
clearly been some increase in protectionism during the crisis. 23 The relative
scope of it has been limited, however, especially by comparison with the far-
reaching scope of the crisis itself.24 It has also occurred largely at the margins,
in terms of its areas of substantive application.25 It is quite telling, thus, that
even as the United States undertook massive liabilities to bail out the U.S.
automobile industry,26 there was little talk of the invocation of potential
safeguard relief or other extraordinary trade measures.
B. Institutional Indicia ofInternationalism Amidst the Crisis
Alongside continued U.S. investment in the international economic and
political order, one might point to a number of institutional commitments to the
latter that emerged during the crisis-and are difficult to reconcile with a story
of insulation and isolation. We might begin, once again, with the IMF. Beyond
its lack of resources, the sense of the IMF's decline in the years preceding the
financial crisis was grounded in its lack of any coherent mandate. With the
shift to floating exchange rates in the 1970s, the original charge of the IMF
was rendered irrelevant.27 Its mixed success-at best-in its subsequent efforts
to alleviate currency and debt crises in developing countries, meanwhile, had
diminished support for a mission directed to those functions.
28
Alongside the G-20's influx of new resources, however, came an
expanded-and emboldened-mandate. The IMF was charged to play a more
active role as policy advisor during financial crises, to beef up its early
warning systems (and thereby prevent future crises), to ensure global liquidity,
and to expand and regularize its economic forecasting activities, including by
22 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23 See Bhala, supra note 1, at 159-60.
24 See id at 160 ("[A]ll of the trade-restricting or trade-distorting measures that members implemented
since October 2008 collectively affected a maximum of 1% of world trade and were concentrated in a few
sectors. .. .").
25 Id
26 See Matthew Dolan, Ford Benefits as GM Chrysler Stumble, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at Bl.
27 Buckley, supra note 5, at 121-22.
28 Id. at 122-35.
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extending them to developed economies.29 At least as to the IMF, thus, the
international order emerged from the crisis stronger and more influential than
at the outset.
The etiology of the IMF's resurgence, in turn, suggests a further indication
of the advance of international institutions, notwithstanding-and perhaps even
on account of-the crisis. With the financial crisis, the G-20 emerged as the
leading mechanism of international economic coordination, displacing the
Group of 7/Group of 8 ("G-7"), which had occupied that role for decades.30
Like the empowerment of the IMF, this might be seen as some indication of a
strengthened international order, given the more inclusive membership of the
G-20.31 More to the point, it too seems inconsistent with a story of isolation,
given the resulting shift from engagement with a smaller circle of
counterparties to a dramatically larger (and more diverse) group.
A final example in the realm of institutional reform might also be cited.
Among the additional undertakings of the G-20 amidst the financial crisis was
the strengthening of the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF")-originally
established by the G-7 in 1999.32 Over the course of its November 2008 and
April 2009 summits in Washington and London, the G-20 expanded the
membership of the FSF to include the entirety of the G-20, as well as a handful
of other national and international representatives.33 This alone, of course,
might be seen to simply echo the shift from the G-7 to the G-20 as the locus of
international economic policymaking. Additionally, however, the G-20 placed
the FSF on significantly strengthened institutional foundations-variously
renaming it the Financial Stability Board, appointing a Secretary-General and
steering committee to lead it, expanding the size of its permanent secretariat,
and expanding its mandate in a number of important respects.34 The
strengthening of the IMF, thus, turns out not to have been an isolated event
amidst the crisis. Contrary to expectations, rather, the financial crisis saw
29 See Bob Davis, IMF Gains New Influence from Summit, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, at A7.
30 See David J. Lynch, Leaders Vow to Do Whatever It Takes, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2008, at IB; cf
Barack Obama, Op-Ed, A Time for Global Action, Cn. TRu., Mar. 24, 2009, § 1, at 25.
31 Duncan Alford highlights an analogous example: the IMF's call for supervisory colleges for
internationally active banks to become "more inclusive," so as "to avoid protectionist tendencies." See Alford,
supra note 3, at 57 n.5.
32 Enrique R. Carrasco, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Forum: The Awakening
and Transformation ofan International Body, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 205-06 (2010).
33 See id. at 214-19.
34 Id.; see also Yadav, supra note 6, at 98-99, 109-14.
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numerous examples of the increased institutionalization of-and hence
increased engagement with-the international order.
C. Aspirational Indicia ofInternationalism Amidst the Crisis
Beyond the fiscal and institutional indicators of a stable-and even
strengthened-international order amidst the financial crisis, certain
aspirational indicia of the latter might also be identified. In these cases, the
vitality of the international order was not manifested (at least to date) by the
investment of dollars or the strengthening of particular institutions. Rather, it is
suggested by our ambitions to, and an attendant rhetoric of, internationalism.
I have already noted the resistance to increased trade barriers in the face of
the recent crisis.35 For the most part, we have not succumbed to the temptations
of protectionism. But the critical insight from trade policy may be even
stronger. For the latter has shown some hints of moving in just the opposite
direction over the last few years. The latter period has thus seen some
reinvigoration of efforts to move the trade agenda forward-the precise
converse of the U.S. response to the 1929 crash. This begins with the Doha
Round, which has seen halting efforts at forward movement in the last few
years.36 It is most evident, however, in the Obama Administration's increased
efforts to get pending free trade agreements-with Colombia, South Korea,
and others-positioned for legislative approval.37
Two further developments, respectively in the financial and investment
arenas, might also be cited in this vein. First, consider the decision of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission-even as the financial crisis was
building steam in November 2008-to propose a dramatic effort to harmonize
financial accounting standards. After years of effort to preserve the place of
U.S. General Accepted Accounting Practices, a surprising release from the
Commission in November 2008 outlined a proposed roadmap for the shift of
U.S. issuers to International Financial Reporting Standards by 2014.38 Again,
35 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
36 See President Barack Obama, The State of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010) ("But realizing those benefits also
means enforcing those agreements so our trading partners play by the rules. And that's why we'll continue to
shape a Doha trade agreement that opens global markets, and why we will strengthen our trade relations in
Asia and with key partners like South Korea and Panama and Colombia.").
37 See id.
38 Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International
Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8982, Exchange Act Release No.
58,960, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,816 (Nov. 21, 2008).
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one might have expected a heightened orientation to domestic standards and
heightened resistance to such international undertakings, given the forbidding
crisis on the horizon. Here as well, however, events proved otherwise. 39
Finally, in terms of aspirational indicia of the continued strength of the
international order-even amidst the crisis-one might consider the essential
disappearance from the public discourse of criticism directed to foreign
investment in the United States by sovereign wealth funds. Before the crisis,
seemingly disproportionate emphasis was placed on concerns about whether
national security interests (broadly defined) might be compromised by
significant ownership stakes in U.S. firms by the sovereign wealth funds of
Abu Dhabi, China, Norway, Singapore, and others.40 Since the onset of the
crisis, however, such talk has largely disappeared. In part, this can be traced to
the diminished level of such activity-and the U.S. government's own
ownership of significant stakes in many U.S. corporations after the crisis. The
level of such foreign investment remains substantial, however, and one might
thus have expected the issue to remain salient-and perhaps even to become
more so, as the crisis progressed and scapegoats were sought.41 To the
contrary, however, the issue has largely faded from the scene.
I do not mean to suggest, to be clear, that we are in the best of all possible
worlds for the international order. Surely there are limits to the pattern
described above, and any number of counter-examples that might be offered.
As already noted, for example, Raj Bhala's contribution to the Symposium
highlights some degree of increased protectionism amidst the crisis.42 At a
more fundamental level, however, we might see his critique of the direction
that the Doha negotiations have gone to suggest deeper limits of the claim I
suggest. Thus, even aside from selective increases in protectionism, the
broader shift in the emphasis of the Doha Round-from its initial orientation
towards poverty reduction and the diminishment of Islamic extremism to the
39 Notably, in February 2010, the Commission reiterated its commitment to the convergence in
accounting standards that it had proposed more than a year earlier on the front-end of the financial crisis. See
Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting Standards, Securities Act Release
No. 9109, Exchange Act Release No. 61,578, 75 Fed. Reg. 9494 (Mar. 2, 2010).
40 See Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues
of Going Slow, 76 U. Cin. L. REv. 111, 112-13 (2009).
41 See Patrick Jenkins, Sovereign Funds Wooed by Central Banks, FiN. TIMEs (London), Mar. 23, 2010,
at 4.
42 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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more standard, technical, and self-interested goals of reciprocity and market
access-might be seen as contrary to the pattern that I suggest.43 Arguably,
however, the shift that Bhala observes had already occurred, long before the
crisis struck." Further, one might plausibly see the shift as fully consistent
with an account of continued commitment to the international order-even if
of a less ambitious and ennobling nature.4 5
Beyond the latter, it also bears noting that not every advance of the
international order is likely to be embraced, even amongst internationalists.
Ross Buckley, for example, highlights the concerns of many about the IMF's
capacity to be effective in the tasks already given to it-let alone as to a new
set of responsibilities.46 Conversely, meanwhile, many would critique the
IMF's abandonment of conditionality in its recent provision of financial
support to developing countries-given the importance of that tool in
advancing critical reforms.47
Even with these caveats, however, it is clear that the international order has
held up better amidst the financial crisis than might have been expected. With
the Great Depression as the obvious analogy, meanwhile, it is equally clear
that it has exceeded the historical record. Given the broad and painful scope of
the recent crisis, it would have been well within the realm of the possible that
we would be living today in "Fortress America."48 That we are not-that we
may even have moved in the opposite direction-thus deserves our attention.
III. A BRAVE NEW WORLD?
How might we explain the international order's striking stability-and even
success-amidst the recent financial crisis? Reasonable expectations and
relevant precedent alike might have predicted a contraction in U.S.
43 See Bhala, supra note 1, at 152-53, 159-60.
44 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REv. 595, 625-31 (2007) (noting the failure of the Doha
Round prior to the onset of the financial crisis). But see Bhala, supra note 1, at 153 (suggesting the shift
occurred "amidst the 'Great Global Recession"'). Bhala's narrower critique of the WTO Secretariat (and its
membership) for framing the Doha negotiations as a way to alleviate the crisis, by contrast, is all but
impossible to dispute. See Bhala, supra note 1, at 150.
45 One might also question whether the ambitions of the Doha Round were ever quite as broad as Bhala
suggests.
46 See Buckley, supra note 5, at 143-45.
47 Cf Patrick J. Keenan & Christiana Ochoa, The Human Rights Potential ofSovereign Wealth Funds, 40
GEo. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1175-76 (2009).
48 Cf WiLLIAM GREIDER, FORTRESS AMERICA (1998).
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engagement with the world. Minimally, they might have predicted a relatively
heavier reliance on domestic-rather than international-policies and
institutions amidst the crisis. Yet neither prediction has proven true. How
might we explain as much?
Part of the explanation, to begin, may lie in the nature of the financial
crisis. Elsewhere, I have described the operative dynamic in the recent crisis as
one of coordination.49 More precisely, the financial crisis arose out of the
multiple equilibrium character of the financial markets-and resulting
interdependence in the behavior of market participants. 0 Both the onset of the
crisis and its resolution thus lay in an alignment of relevant expectations. On
the front end, the crisis was defined by an alignment of expectations around the
prospect of reduced investment, diminished lending, and resulting market
contraction. The fundamental task in responding to the crisis, in turn, was to
shift expectations back to the preferred equilibrium of investment, lending, and
the like.52
Given the foregoing, the prospects for insulation and isolation were
necessarily diminished. Even if the United States could somehow have
insulated its markets from outside influence, it could not insulate market
participants' expectations. Any coherent response to the crisis thus had to
recognize-and attend to-markets generally and not domestic markets
alone. 53 For that reason, the expected-and conventional-response of
insulation and isolation may simply have been inapposite in the recent crisis.
Further explanation might take us beyond the nature of the crisis itself, to
the international political economy within which it took place. Over the last
thirty years, a dramatic transformation has occurred in the creditor-debtor
relationship of the United States (among other industrialized nations) and the
rest of the world. When Ronald Reagan came into office, the United States was
49 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95
MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
50 See Russell Cooper & Andrew John, Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models, 103
Q.J. ECON. 441, 447 (1988); Douglas W. Diamond & Phillip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECoN. 401 (1983).
51 Hence, the familiar rhetoric of "systemic risk," "contagion," and "herd behavior" with reference to
financial, banking, and currency crises.
52 As to this task, Yesha Yadav highlights the important point that effective crisis response may require
not only assistance to relatively smaller banks and other private institutions-but also to the relatively weak
regulators with primary responsibility to oversee the latter. See Yadav, supra note 6, at 103-06.
53 Yadav notes, in this regard, the systemic risks attendant to the collapse of even relatively small
banking institutions. See Yadav, supra note 6, at 106, 112.
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the world's largest creditor.54 Today, however, it is the world's largest debtor,
with debts in excess of $12 trillion. Even more striking is the holding of that
debt-in substantial part-by countries including Brazil, China, Russia, and
56Taiwan. Over the last several decades, the international flow of capital has, in
a sense, reversed itself.
Given as much, the stability of the U.S. economy is now dependent on
open markets, both for capital and for goods, in ways it has not previously
been. Much of the persistent, and even heightened, engagement of the United
States with the international order, even amidst the financial crisis, might be
understood through this prism. Because of the importance of continued trade
and investment flows to the United States, it becomes essential for us to ensure
them-by resisting protectionism, sustaining both U.S. and global financial
markets, and encouraging the stability of foreign governments.
Finally, at the intersection of the foregoing explanations, we may simply
stand at a very different place than twenty years ago, let alone the 1930s. For
all the talk of "globalization" over the last few decades, for much of that time,
it was just that: talk. In fact, that may have been its primary purpose-as a
mechanism to evangelize and to promote, as much as to describe.
In recent years, by contrast, there has been far less talk of globalization. In
one view, this might be seen to suggest some reduction in globalization's scope
or power. It might suggest some abandonment of the project. It might, on the
other hand, signal just the opposite. If the talk of globalization was primarily
about its promotion and advancement, the latter may simply have ceased to be
a relevant project. We may be talking less about globalization, in this view,
because it's now a reality. It's the "new normal."57
If so, our expectations as to how states are likely to respond to crises may
require reassessment. Likewise, the policy prescriptions we choose to
emphasize in the face of potential (and ongoing) international crises also
require reassessment. Even our institutional frameworks for grappling with
54 See Robert Z. Aliber, The Global Savings Tsunamis, WILSON Q., Summer 2009, at 56.
55 See Elizabeth Becker & Edmund L. Andrews, IMF. Warns That U.S. Debt Is Threatening Global
Stability, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 8, 2004, at Cl; Edmund L. Andrews, Federal Government Faces Balloon in Debt
Payments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at Al.
56 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, http://www.treas.gov/
tic/mfh.txt (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
57 Cf Bhala, supra note 1, at 163-64 n.63 (noting "inter-dependent [] global supply chains and
manufacturing processes").
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financial crises may warrant reassessment, if such crises turn out to have
potential to drive us closer together, rather than further apart. Borrowing from
an entirely different kind of crisis, we may have unwittingly crossed our own
Rubicon, arriving at a new international order, with little possibility of turning
back.
